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Abstract 
 
 
This paper assesses how legal-origin influences financial development through regulation 
quality and the rule of law. It uses data collected after pioneering works on the law-finance nexus 
to assess hypotheses resulting there-from in the context of Africa. Distinctions are made between 
English, French, French sub-Saharan, Portuguese and North African countries in how their legal 
origins affect financial intermediary dynamics of depth, efficiency, size and activity. In terms of 
policy implications results support the benefits of law channels to financial development in the 
continent.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 Hitherto most empirical work on the law-finance nexus has been of global appeal and 
based on very limited data. After the pioneering study of La Porta et al. (hence LLSV, 1998) the 
need to collect data that can best proxy law standards became a priority in the World Bank 
Development Indicators. Today as far as we have perused, the absence of a study that reflects the 
African context in the light of outcomes of pioneering studies and resulting hypotheses is 
deserving of examination. The big appeal of this paper is that to the best of our knowledge it is 
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the first of its kind to use data collected after pioneering works on the law-finance nexus to 
assess hypotheses resulting from those pioneering works exclusively in the context of Africa1. 
The African continent is an ideal premise for the assessment of outcomes of first works because 
not only is it lagging behind financially; it has also been a fertile ground for neocolonialism2.   
The relationship between legal origin and the finance-growth nexus has been investigated in the 
literature via various strands of research. For the interest of making our paper’s road-map clear it 
is logical to club them into five categories.  
 The first strand consists of a growing body of work which suggests that cross-country 
differences in legal-origin explain cross-country differences in financial development and 
growth. LLSV (1998) pioneered this strand and many authors have since taken from them in the 
assertion that English common-law countries have better prospects for financial development 
than French civil-law countries. They posit that countries with common-law traditions (French 
civil-law traditions) furnish the strongest (weakest) legal protection to shareholders and creditors 
(LLSV, 1998, 2000). The edge of English legal-origin over French colonial legacy has been 
generalized and extended to many other aspects of management and government: more 
informative accounting standards(LLSV,1998), better institutions with less corrupt 
governments(LLSV,1999) and more efficient courts(Djankov et al.,2003). While this strand has 
been largely dedicated to understanding ‘if ’ legal-origin matters in financial development, the 
concern of ‘why’ legal-origin matters remained elusive until Beck et al.(2003) assessed some 
theories to address the issue.  
                         
1
 Macro-economic law quality data on the African continent was not available before the pioneering work of LLSV 
(1998). The first working paper of this work was published by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
in 1996. Data on the quality of regulation and the rule of law for the African continent saw light from that same 
year.  
2
 Neocolonialism from a law/political perspective is the perpetration of colonial legacy (legal traditions) through 
economic and political means. Most pioneering studies focused on exploring how (LLSV, 1998) and why (Beck et 
al., 2003) legal traditions matter in financial development.  
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 In the second strand of literature Beck et al. (2003) shed some light on the concern of 
‘why’ legal origin matter in finance by empirically assessing two channel-based theories. The 
political channel lays emphasis in that legal traditions differ in the priority they attribute to the 
rights of individual investors vis-à-vis the state. It follows that championing of investors rights 
should have a greater bearing on financial development. The adaptability channel postulates that 
legal traditions differ in their capacity to adapt to changing business circumstances. This implies 
countries in which legal systems provide for adjustments with respect to changing and evolving 
circumstances should have a higher propensity to financial development. Therefore this strand 
solves the “why” puzzle in asserting that legal origin matters in financial progress because 
traditionally, legal origins differ in their ability to adapt and adjust efficiently to changing and 
evolving economic conditions.  
 In the third strand we find literature championing the nexus that financial development 
significantly contributes to a country’s overall economic growth (McKinnon, 1973).  This 
optimism is shared and empirically supported at the country level (King & Levine, 1993; Levine 
& Zervos, 1998; Allen et al., 2005), as well as at industry and firm levels (Jayaratne & Strahan, 
1996; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). 
 In the fourth strand the law-finance (growth) relationship is addressed. It provides 
evidence for the link among law, finance and economic growth at firm, industry and country 
levels (Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; Beck & Levine, 2002).  
 The fifth strand largely dedicated to African countries is pioneered by the Mundell (1972) 
conjecture, which theorized that Anglophone countries shaped by British activism and openness 
(to experiment) would naturally be rewarded with higher levels of financial development than 
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their francophone neighbors (geared by French reliance on monetary stability and automaticity)3. 
Recent literature on the African continent has wholly (Agbor, 2011) or partially (Asongu, 2011) 
confirmed the edge of English common-law countries in growth and finance prospects 
respectively4. Historically it should be noted that the partition of sub-Saharan Africa into British 
and French spheres in the 19th century resulted in the implementation of two distinct colonial 
policies5.The contributions of the present paper to the literature differs from those of Agbor 
(2011) and Asongu (2011) by: (1) investigating the law-finance nexus in the whole of the 
African continent and using North-African (sub-Saharan African) dummies to distinguish the 
effects of North African (sub-Saharan African) countries; (2) using law indicators to assess the 
relationship between legal origin and finance6; (3) utilizing much recent data for more focused 
and updated policies implications7. Beside these specific appeals, as we must have mentioned 
earlier to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to empirically verify the Mundell(1972) 
and  La Porta et al.(1998)8 hypotheses in the African continent using law channels.  
                         
3
 “The French and English traditions in monetary theory and history have been different… The French tradition has 
stressed the passive nature of monetary policy and the importance of exchange stability with convertibility; stability 
has been achieved at the expense of institutional development and monetary experience. The British countries by 
opting for monetary independence have sacrificed stability, but gained monetary experience and better developed 
monetary institutions.”(Mundell, 1972; pp.42-43). 
4
 While Agbor (2011) assesses how legal-origin affects economic performance, Asongu (2011) proposes four 
theories in assessing why legal-origin matters in growth and welfare. Both studies are focused on the sub-Saharan 
part of the African continent.  
5
 The British and French implemented two different colonial policies. While the French imposed a highly 
centralized bureaucratic system that clearly underlined empire-building, the British on their part administered 
decentralized, flexible and pragmatic policies. Economic ambitions dominated British colonial activities who sought 
to transform their colonies into commercially viable trading countries through the indirect-rule: producing raw 
material and consuming British manufactures. The French on their part propagated their imperial ambitions through 
the policy of assimilation.  
6
 While Agbor(2011) used channels of education and trade in investigating how colonial origin affects the economic 
performance of sub-Saharan African countries, Asongu(2011) on his part has used financial channels in explaining 
why colonial legacy matters in growth and welfare. In this study we shall use law channels.  
7
 While Agbor (2011) used data ranging from 1960 to 2000, that of Asongu (2011) varied from 1986 to 2008. We 
shall used data ranging from 1996 to 2008.  
8
 The outcome reveals that common-law countries generally have the strongest legal protection of corporate 
shareholders and creditors, while French civil law countries are the weakest in legal protection of investors (La Porta 
et al., 1998; page 1). 
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 The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 discusses the 
various law channels while the dynamics of financial intermediary development are looked at in 
Section 3. Data sources and methodology are revealed and outlined respectively in Section 4. 
Empirical analyses and discussion of results are reported in Section 5, followed by a conclusion 
in Section 6.  
 
2. Law channels and finance theory  
 
2.1 Regulators quality 
 
 In the regulatory-quality channel we posit that a legal system that allows for independent 
bodies that set rules, oversee them and sanction those who fail to respect them is more likely to 
create favorable conditions for financial development. This is because the power of the 
government in business activities is largely limited by the presence of the independent bodies 
that check the organs of power and government. Most French civil-law countries are 
characterized by little decentralization, absence of federations, no senates at the parliamentary 
levels, appointment of judges and governors by the central government…etc, which greatly 
reduces the power of regulatory quality. On the other hand, regulatory organs in English 
common-law countries are not appointed by government and not subject to allegiance to the 
powers that be. This independence guarantees greater regulatory quality and consequently better 
conditions for respect of the rule of law.   
 
2.2 Rule of law 
 
The rule-of-law channel holds that legal traditions differ in their emphasis on law vis-à-
vis the rights of the state and private property rights (from the premise of financial development). 
While countries with civil-law origin provide for legal systems that tend to emphasize the rights 
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of the state rather than those of private property, common-law legal traditions champion private-
property rights that provide favorable conditions for financial development. As emphasized by 
Beck et al.(2003), a powerful state will tend to create policies and institutions that divert the flow 
of competitive financial intermediary market. Furthermore, a powerful state would interfere in 
financial markets and create adverse conditions for financial development. Therefore we join 
LLSV (1998) in asserting that countries with French civil-law legacies will nurse legal systems 
that engender negative effects on financial development.  
 
3. Financial intermediary dynamics and law 
 
3.1 Financial depth 
 
 Borrowing from Asongu (2011) we posit that the quantity of money supply in the 
economy (M2) and the amount of money held by deposit money banks (Liquid liabilities) 
depend on legal origins. Financial depth should be higher in countries with English common-law 
than in countries with French civil-law legacy because the former provides more appealing 
conditions to openness (trade and capital) and competition. It follows that an economic 
atmosphere where openness and competition are championed will breed an ideal environment 
that increases money velocity or financial depth at overall economic (M2) and bank (Liquid 
liability) levels.  
3.2 Financial efficiency 
 As emphasized by Asongu (2011) countries with French civil-law legacy will turn to 
experience higher levels of financial intermediary allocation efficiency both at bank (banking 
system efficiency) and economic (financial system efficiency) levels. French financial traditions 
have always emphasized the passive nature of monetary policy, the importance of exchange 
stability with convertibility and the explicit need for deposit insurance. A substantial deterrent to 
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bank-run is the presence of exchange rate stability with the country’s main trading partners. 
Since English common-law systems with no explicit deposit insurance and monetary 
independence have sacrificed stability for monetary experience and better developed financial 
institutions, they turn to lend-out less of mobilized funds(in order to avoid bank-run).  
 
3.3 Financial size 
  
 The relative importance of openness and competition should induce a broader financial 
system in common-law countries than in their civil-law counterparts. In the presence of a 
competitive atmosphere (where a country is opened to trade and capital as championed by 
English common-law), increase in financial transactions and institutions will have a direct 
impact on broadening the size of the financial system.  
 
3.4 Financial activity 
 
Financial activity is a corollary of financial depth as the later is the immediate result of 
the former. Countries that are opened and competitive will turn to induce greater economic 
activity which naturally goes hand in glove with financial activity. It follows that countries with 
common-law legacies have greater levels of financial activity than those with civil-law origin.  
 
4. Data and Methodology  
 
4.1 Data 
 
 We examine a sample of 38 African countries with British, French and Portuguese legal 
origins (see Appendix 1).  While our law and control variables are obtained from African 
Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB), financial intermediary development 
indicators are gotten from the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD). Owing 
the very novel nature of law indicators, data span is from 1996 to 2008.  We include origin of 
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countries in our data to account for endogeneity.  As pointed-out by Beck et al. (2003) from 
Berkowitz et al. (2002), it is paramount to distinguish between legal origin countries (United 
Kingdom, France, the U.S.A, Germany, Austria and Switzerland) which constituted the legal 
traditions from transplant countries which received the legal legacies. For the purpose of our 
paper this isn’t much of an issue because legal origins are primarily used as instruments. We 
classify collected data into the following four categories.  
 
4.1.1 Law indicators  
 
a) Regulatory Quality  
 
 According to the World Bank the quality of regulation captures perceptions on the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that enable and 
foster private sector development. The concept is measured by both representative9 and non-
representative10 sources. This indicator is appreciated in percentile rank from 0 to 100.  
 
 
 
 
 
                         
9
 Representative sources include: unfair competitive practices, price controls, discriminatory tariffs, discriminatory 
taxes, excessive protections, burden of administrative regulations, distortional tax system, import barrier, cost of 
tariffs as obstacle to growth, degree of competition in local market, ease of starting a company, laxity of anti-
monopoly policy, how  ineffective environmental regulations hurt competitiveness, foreign investment nature, 
banking & Finance,  administered prices and market prices, ease of market entry for new firms, competition between 
businesses, regulation arrangements ,investment profiles, tax effectiveness, efficiency of  the country’s tax 
collection system, degree of clarity and transparency in rules, and  assessment of the quality of business laws.  
 
10
 Non-representative sources include: trade policy, business regulatory environment, problematic nature of tax 
regulations for the growth in business, problematic nature of customs and trade regulations for growth in business, 
competition, price liberalization, trade & foreign exchange system, competition policy, conditions for rural financial 
services development, investment climate in rural businesses, access to agricultural input and produce markets, 
business regulatory environment, trade policy, how  protectionism in the  country affects affect fairness of 
competition, how price control affect pricing of products of industries, access to capital market(foreign and 
domestic), how ease of doing business is not a competitive advantage for the country, freedom of foreign investors 
to acquire control in domestic companies, how public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bidders, non 
distortional  nature of  real personal taxes, non distortional nature of real corporate, how banking regulation hinders 
competitiveness, how labor regulations hinder business activities, impairment of economic development by 
subsidies, ease to start business.  
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b) Rule of Law 
 
 This indicator captures perceptions on the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of property rights, the courts, the 
police, contract enforcement, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. It is measured in 
percentile rank from 0 to 100 from a plethora of criteria with representative11 and non-
representative12 sources.   
 What is crucially worth noting is that these two measures incorporate the four indicators 
considered by Beck et al. (2003) in theorizing the political and adaptability channels of law. We 
may even add more flesh to the bone in asserting that our indicators go much further than theirs; 
in fact they are a summary or reflection of a plethora of indicators mentioned on the footnotes 
pertaining to their definitions and elucidations above.  
 
 
 
 
 
                         
11
 Representative sources include: violent crime, organized crime, fairness of the judicial process, enforcement of 
contracts, speediness of judicial process, confiscation/expropriation, intellectual property rights protection, private 
property protection, cost of common crimes on business, cost of organized crime on business, pervasiveness of 
money laundering through banks, effectiveness of police, independence of the judiciary from political influence of 
government(citizens or firms), efficiency of legal framework to challenge the legality of government action, strength 
of intellectual property protection, strength of financial assets protection,  rate of illegal donations to parties, 
percentage of unofficial or unregistered firms, rate of tax evasion, confidence in the police force, confidence in the 
judicial system, rate of victimization of crime, independence of the judiciary, respect of law in relation between 
citizens and the administration, security of persons and goods, organized crime and activity, effectiveness of the 
fiscal system, effectiveness of the judicial system, security of property rights, security of contracts between private 
agents, government respect for contracts, settlement of economic disputes, justice in commercial matters, 
intellectual property protection, effectiveness of arrangements for the protection of intellectual property, security 
rights and property transactions, trafficking of peoples, judicial independence, level of impartiality of investors, and  
threat of crime to business.  
 
12
 Non-representative sources include: Property rights and rule based on governance, family fear of crime, family 
mistrust in police, rate of family victimization by crime, trust in courts of law, trust in police, trust in property rights 
and rule based governance,  accountability of the judiciary, trust in the police, trust in the Supreme Court, degree of 
common practice of tax evasion, degree of social justice, personal security and protection of private property, and 
enforcement of patent and copyright protection.  
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4.1.2 Financial intermediary variables 
 
 Financial intermediary variables are obtained after computations from the FDSD. We 
stop short of collecting data on financial markets because Ivory Coast is the sole country in 
Francophone sub-Saharan Africa (of French civil-legal origin) with information on stock 
markets. Beyond this fact, the regional nature of its financial market renders it even harder to 
disentangle individual contributions of the eight West African countries that make-it up(seven 
French legal origin countries and one Portuguese legal tradition country). On the contrary, we 
found many English law tradition countries with stock market information (Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe…etc). 
The four North African countries also possess stock market data. However since majority of 
countries do not, this disparity poses a practical difficulty of coming-up with harmonious 
evaluation criteria for the financial market data. We are then poised to limit our analysis to the 
financial intermediary sector. Classification of the following indicators is in line the FDSD 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 1999) and recent empirical law-finance literature (Asongu, 2011).    
 
a) Financial depth 
 We proxy financial depth both from overall-economic and financial system perspectives 
by indicators of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) 
respectively. Both variables in ratios of GDP should robustly check each other as either account 
for over 97% of information in the other (see Appendix 2). 
 
b) Financial efficiency 
 
 Here neither do we refer to the profitability-oriented concept of financial efficiency nor to 
the production efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (via Data Envelopment 
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Analysis: DEA). What we yearn to address is the ability of banks to effectively fulfill their 
fundamental role of transforming mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators. We 
acknowledge two measures for banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-efficiency 
(respectively ‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on financial 
system deposits: Fcfd’). Like in the case of financial depth, these two financial intermediary 
allocation efficiency proxies can check each other as they represent more than 87% of variability 
in one another (see Appendix 2). 
 
c) Financial size 
 
 Consistent with the FDSD we appreciate financial intermediary activity as the ratio of 
“deposit bank assets” to the “total assets” (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit 
bank assets: Dbacba). It is unfortunate we could not find another indicator of financial size 
despite a thorough search, numerous computations and deepened correlation analyses. 
 
d) Financial activity  
 
 Financial intermediary activity here is defined as the ability of banks to grant credit to 
economic operators. We measure bank-sector-activity with “private domestic credit by deposit 
banks: Pcrb” and financial-sector-activity with “private credit by domestic banks and other 
financial institutions: Pcrbof”. Here again, the later indicator checks the former as it represents 
more than 93% of information in the former (see Appendix 2).  
 
4.1.3 Instrumental variables 
 
 We examine traditional legal origin dummies for the English, French and Portuguese 
colonial legacies. In order to improve our contribution to the literature we add dummies for sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) and North Africa. These dummies are primarily used as instruments. But 
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for the SSAfrican dummy which reflects about 85% of the French legal origin dummy, all other 
dummies reflect quite distinct information or variability (see Appendix 2).  
 
4.1.4 Control variables 
 
 Our control variables are in accordance with the literature (Levine & King, 1993; Hassan 
et al., 2011). We shall therefore control for inflation, trade, population growth, GDP growth, 
GDP per capita growth as well as government’s general final consumption expenditure in the 
law-finance regressions. These control variables are obtained from ADI of the WB.  
 
4.1.5 Brief comparative analyses from Table 1  
 
 Table 1 shows comparative summary statistics for the English, French, sub-Saharan 
French, Portuguese and North African countries. A close look suggests that contrary to popular 
consensus North African countries on average dominate in financial intermediary aspects of 
depth, size and activity. What is also quite remarkable is the overwhelming dominance of 
countries with French civil legal origin in financial intermediary efficiency. Law indicators are 
also found to be highest on average in North African countries and least in Portuguese and 
French sub-Saharan countries.  These figures provide us forehand with the basis of including 
sub-Saharan and North African dummies in the empirical analysis. Preliminary evidence on 
differences in levels of trade and inflation is in line with the law-finance (growth) theory. 
English countries manifest higher levels of trade because they traditionally have legal systems 
that provide for openness (in trade and capital) and competition: this is in accordance with Agbor 
(2011). On the other hand it is not unexpected that countries with French legal tradition should 
have the lowest levels of inflation. French colonial legacy is focused on lowering levels of 
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inflation because their former colonies have sacrificed financial independence and monetary 
experience for exchange stability (Mundell, 1972). 
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 Table 1: Comparative Statistics 
  
     Data  
Financial Intermediary  Development Variables Law  Variables Control Variables Instrumental  Variables 
Stats Depth Efficiency Activity Size Reg. 
Qua. 
Rule of 
Law 
 
Infl. 
 
Trade 
 
Popg 
Gov. 
Exp. 
 
GDPg 
GDP 
pcg 
 
Eng. 
 
Frch. 
 
Port. 
 
Frssa 
 
Nafri 
 M2 Fdgdp Bcbd Fcfd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
 
 
Mean 
English       0.382 0.330 0.613 0.694 0.205 0.254 0.727 0.378 0.407 10.79 87.88 2.096 16.09 4.654 2.49 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 0.267 0.190 0.840 0.858 0.153 0.161 0.729 0.305 0.278 3.748 65.31 2.577 12.62 4.146 1.55 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 0.346 0.252 0.496 0.495 0.143 0.143 0.701 0.267 0.259 112.57 94.20 2.172 13.18 6.404 3.916 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 0.198 0.128 0.860 0.873 0.108 0.110 0.684 0.280 0.243 3.873 63.40 2.832 11.96 4.076 1.236 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafrica 0.656 0.542 0.721 0.754 0.393 0.417 0.895 0.422 0.472 3.959 68.45 1.450 14.70 4.616 3.135 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 0.323 0.255 0.708 0.750 0.174 0.197 0.725 0.332 0.330 18.84 77.64 1.450 14.14 4.597 2.202 0.421 0.473 0.105 0.394 0.105 
                      
 
 
S.D 
English       0.274 0.255 0.279 0.505 0.199 0.317 0.265 0.185 0.216 14.87 46.61 0.869 5.72 3.70 3.50 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 0.176 0.156 0.281 0.304 0.142 0.156 0.178 0.148 0.175 8.744 28.85 1.16 4.73 4.21 3.96 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 0.216 0.207 0.185 0.177 0.141 0.141 0.272 0.164 0.250 574.06 34.92 0.382 4.44 7.12 6.87 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 0.062 0.055 0.241 0.254 0.052 0.056 0.158 0.135 0.156 9.55 30.20 1.102 4.848 4.48 4.12 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafrica 0.179 0.156 0.367 0.416 0.195 0.211 0.120 0.135 0.141 3.581 20.29 0.334 2.782 2.303 2.304 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 0.232 0.218 0.301 0.409 0.170 0.240 0.228 0.171 0.211 193.5 39.88 1.02 5.41 4.45 4.24 0.494 0.499 0.307 0.489 0.307 
                      
 
 
Min. 
English       0.001 0.001 0.177 0.209 0.001 0.001 0.017 0.044 0.029 -100 17.85 -1.07 5.41 -16.7 -17.1 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 0.069 0.029 0.143 0.144 0.020 0.020 0.331 0.054 0.019 -100 21.57 0.591 2.650 -12.6 -15.1 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 0.102 0.054 0.133 0.137 0.011 0.011 0.110 0.044 0.014 -3.50 36.80 1.414 6.331 -28.1 -29.6 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 0.069 0.029 0.188 0.178 0.020 0.020 0.331 0.054 0.019 -100 21.57 0.707 2.650 -12.6 -15.1 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafrica 0.318 0.235 0.143 0.144 0.041 0.041 0.627 0.156 0.105 18.67 38.36 0.591 6.77 -2.22 -3.59 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 0.001 0.001 0.133 0.137 0.001 0.001 0.017 0.044 0.014 -100 17.85 -1.07 2.65 -28.1 -29.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                      
 
 
Max. 
English       1.279 1.054 1.574 2.606 0.810 1.624 1.155 0.792 0.810 132.82 255.0 4.23 35.13 27.46 22.61 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 1.057 0.858 1.718 1.646 0.704 0.698 1.264 0.698 0.610 31.11 156.8 10.56 28.76 33.62 29.06 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 0.802 0.739 0.807 0.806 0.477 0.478 0.999 0.556 0.767 4145 179.0 3.03 21.28 20.61 17.11 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 0.410 0.309 1.718 1.646 0.246 0.279 1.003 0.698 0.519 31.11 156.8 10.56 28.76 33.62 29.06 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafrica 1.057 0.858 1.277 1.614 0.704 0.698 1.264 0.688 0.610 0.339 124.6 1.923 19.35 12.21 10.59 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 1.279 1.054 1.718 2.606 0.810 1.624 1.264 0.792 0.810 4145 255.0 10.56 35.13 33.62 29.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
                      
 
 
 
Obs. 
English       199 199 206 199 199 199 201 160 159 193 208 208 193 208 208 --- --- --- --- --- 
French 226 226 231 226 226 226 231 180 180 220 225 234 222 234 234 --- --- --- --- --- 
Portuguese 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 40 40 52 39 39 39 52 52 --- --- --- --- --- 
Frenchssa 187 187 192 187 187 187 192 150 150 181 186 195 183 195 195 --- --- --- --- --- 
Northafrica 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 40 40 52 52 52 52 52 52 --- --- --- --- --- 
Data 477 477 489 477 477 477 484 380 379 465 472 481 454 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. M2: Monetary Base. Fdgdp: Financial system deposits. Bcbd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial system credit on 
Financial system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by financial institutions (deposit money banks and other financial institutions). Dbacba: Deposit bank 
assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. Reg.Qua: Regulation Quality. Infl: Inflation. Popg: Population growth. Gov.Exp: Government Expenditure. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita 
growth. Eng: English legal origin. Frch: French legal origin. Port: Portuguese legal origin. Frssa: French sub-Saharan Africa. Nafri: North Africa.  
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4.2 Methodology  
 
4.2.1 Estimation method 
 
 Following Beck et al. (2003) and recent empirical literature (Agbor, 2011; Asongu, 
2011) we employ a Two-Stage-Least Squares (TSLS) with dummies of legal origins as 
instrumental variables. This estimation technique has the particular advantage of addressing 
the issue of endogeneity: the instrumental variable estimator can avoid the bias that Ordinary 
Least Squares estimates suffers when explanatory variables in a regression are correlated with 
the error term. Beyond this fact, the object of our paper which is to evaluate how legal origins 
affect finance through proposed law channels requires an Instrumental Variable (hence IV) 
estimation method. In this approach we shall adopt the following steps: 
-justify the use of a TSLS over an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation technique via the 
Hausman-test for endogeneity; 
-show that instrumental variables (legal origins) are exogenous to the endogenous components 
of explaining variables (law channels), conditional on other covariates; 
-verify the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the equation of 
interest through an Over-identifying restriction (OIR) test.  
 Thus our methodology will include the following models: 
 
First-stage regression:  
 
++= itit BritishLawChannel )(10 γγ +itFrench)(2γ itPortuguese)(3γ
                       (1) 
                               itaNorthAfric )(4γ υα ++ itiX
 
 
 
++= itit BritishLawChannel )(10 γγ +itFrenchssa)(2γ itPortuguese)(3γ
                  (2) 
                               itaNorthAfric )(4γ υα ++ itiX  
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Second-stage regression: 
 
++= itit egulationQualityofrFinance )(10 γγ +itRuleoflaw)(2γ +itiXβ µ
                     (3)                                           
  
  
In the three equations, X is a set of exogenous variables that are included in some of 
the second stage regressions. For the first/second and third equations,  v  and u, respectively 
denote the error terms. Instrumental variables are the five legal origin dummies. Frenchssa: 
dummy for French SSA.  
 
4.2.2 Choice of endogenous regressors for control at the second-stage of the TSLS 
 
 Logically the choice of endogenous regressors (control covariates) at the second stage 
of the TSLS method is very crucial. These covariates must a priori be justified by an 
underlying theory in which instruments explain them. In this study we choose Trade13, 
Inflation and GDPg as endogenous control variables. From theoretical and historical 
assessments legal-origins (instruments) are exogenous to the amount of trade because, English   
common-law was based on openness (and competition) where colonies were fashioned to be 
trading societies (raw material producers and consumers of British manufactures) while 
French civil-law countries were not. From Mundell (1972), we can infer that countries with 
French civil-law origin prefer monetary stability over monetary experience, implying inflation 
is explained by legal tradition (instruments).  English legal origin countries turn to grow faster 
(GDPg growth) than their French civil-law counterparts (Agbor, 2011); this provides evidence 
that GDPg is an endogenous variable of control.  Thus we use all control variables under 
consideration (outlined in Section 4.1.4) in the first stage regressions but only control for 
Trade, Inflation and GDP growth at the second stage of the regressions.  
                         
13
 This has been recently verified by Agbor (2011) in sub-Saharan Africa.  
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5. Cross-country regressions 
 
 This section presents the results from cross-country regressions to assess the 
importance of legal origin in explaining cross-country variance in financial development, the 
ability of legal origin to explain cross-country disparities in the quality of regulation and rule 
of law indicators, and the ability of the exogenous components of the law channels (quality of 
regulation and rule of law) to account for cross-country differences in financial development.  
 
5.1 Legal origins and financial intermediary dynamics 
 In Table 2, we regress our financial intermediary development indicators on the 
British, French (or French SSA), Portuguese and North-African legal origin dummies and also 
test for their joint significance. The constant captures the Scandinavian legal origin. Results of 
the Fisher tests in Table 2 show that distinguishing African countries by legal origin helps 
explain cross-country differences in financial depth, efficiency, size and activity. Thus this 
confirms the findings first brought to light by LLSV (1998), backed by Beck et al. (2003) and 
recently confirmed by Asongu (2011) using four law-finance theories. Even after controlling 
for trade, inflation, population growth, government expenditure and GDP growth, the legal 
origin dummies enter jointly significantly in all regressions at a 1% significance level.   
 The outcome in Table 2 also reveals that while English legal-origin countries on 
average have substantially higher levels of financial intermediary depth, size and activity, 
their French legal-origin counterparts on average overwhelmingly dominated in financial 
intermediary efficiency. Countries with Portuguese legal-origin fall in-between. This confirms 
recent findings of Asongu (2011) and Agbor (2011) in law-finance and law-economic 
performance literatures respectively which focused on Africa. Our addition of two dummies 
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to the analysis sheds some light on the nature of North-African countries and their French 
SSAfrican neighbors. The former dominates English legal origin countries in financial depth 
and activity, while the later (SSA-French) have on average lower levels of financial depth, 
efficiency and size when compared to average levels of other countries within the French 
sphere of legal-origin influence. A common-sense inference is that Francophone North 
African counties dominate their SSA-Francophone counterparts in financial intermediary 
dynamics of depth, activity and size.   
 
Table 2: Financial dynamics and legal-origin regressions 
  
 Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity   Financial Size 
  Model 1 Model 1* Model 2 Model 2* Model 3 Model 3* Model 4 Model 4* 
  M2 Fdgdp Bcbd Fcfd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Dbacba 
 
 
 
Legal origin 
dummies 
(Instruments) 
English 0.351*** 0.208*** 0.968*** 0.421*** 0.171*** 0.239*** 0.587*** 0.499*** 
 (8.860) (9.148) (15.68) (6.550) (5.828) (5.374) (15.41) (16.42) 
French 0.196*** --- 1.160*** --- 0.067*** --- 0.549*** --- 
 (5.077)  (19.18)  (2.993)  (18.92)  
Frchssa --- 0.045** --- 0.704*** --- 0.130*** --- 0.502*** 
  (2.257)  (13.10)  (2.864)  (18.97) 
Portuguese 0.449*** 0.217*** 0.896*** 0.420*** 0.147*** 0.178*** 0.741*** 0.578*** 
 (9.689) (5.889) (12.21) (4.449) (4.520) (3.380) (16.23) (11.70) 
Nafri 0.382*** 0.410*** -0.164*** 0.423*** 0.249*** 0.307*** 0.187*** 0.597*** 
 (13.74) (15.74) (-3.721) (6.132) (11.00) (7.687) (6.866) (17.10) 
 
 
 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
Trade 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** ---  0.0009*** 0.002*** 
 (6.066) (7.509) (-4.982) (-2.635)   (3.771) (8.321) 
Inflation -0.003*** -0.000*** -0.003*** --- -0.002*** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.0001*** 
 (-4.500) (-2.691) (-2.719)  (-3.720) (-2.513) (-4.109) (-3.067) 
Gov. Exp --- --- --- 0.021*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.006*** --- 
    (5.825) (2.810) (3.991) (3.570)  
GDPg --- -0.004** --- --- --- --- --- 0.005** 
  (-2.206)      (1.983) 
Popg -0.032*** --- -0.057*** --- --- -0.036*** --- --- 
 (-3.470)  (-3.807)   (-3.080)   
 
F-test(for Instruments) 77.41*** 212.12*** 17.79*** 249.4*** 36.49*** 71.52*** 24.16*** 679.75*** 
Adjusted R² 0.525 0.775 0.192 0.779 0.301 0.545 0.256 0.916 
Observations  415 428 425 423 413 413 404 433 
M2: Monetary Base. Fdgdp: Financial system deposits. Bcbd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. 
Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank 
assets plus deposit bank assets. Popg: Population growth. Gov.Exp: Government Expenditure. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. *, 
**, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Student t-statistics are presented in brackets.  
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The edge of financial efficiency SSA-Francophone countries have over North African 
countries (which are predominantly French14) could be explained by part of Mundell’s(1972) 
conjecture which has been recently elucidated by Asongu(2011)15. 
 
5.2 Legal origins and law channels 
 
 Table 3 based on equations (1) and (2) assesses whether legal origin explains cross-
country differences in the law indicators which characterize the law channel. We regress the 
proxies for regulation quality and rule of law on the legal origin dummy variables. We report 
the F-tests of whether the legal origin dummy variables taken together explain significantly 
cross-country divergences in law indicators. It can logically be concluded that legal origin 
helps explain cross-country variations in the quality of regulation and rule of law indicators of 
the law channel at a 1% significance level. It is worth noting that this is the first condition for 
the use of a TSLS methodology which requires that, the endogenous components of 
exogenous regressors in the equation of interest be explained by the instruments(legal-origins) 
conditional  on other covariates(control variables).    
 From a comparative view-point, English common-law countries on average 
overwhelmingly dominated both in the quality of regulation and the rule of law. They are 
                         
14
 With the exception of Egypt.  
15
 “We propose financial intermediary allocation efficiency channels based on two factors: bank system 
efficiency and financial system efficiency. We postulate that countries with French civil-law origin should have 
legal systems that provide for greater levels of allocation efficiency because their banks lend-out a greater chunk 
of mobilized funds (deposits). French tradition has always stressed the passive nature of monetary policy, the 
importance of exchange stability with convertibility, and the need for explicit deposit insurance. On the other 
hand English common-law systems with no explicit insurance deposits and monetary independence have 
sacrificed stability for monetary experience and better developed monetary institutions. Therefore a greater 
proportion of deposits mobilized by bank are retained in common-law countries to avoid bank-run. A substantial 
deterrent to bank-run is exchange rate stability which is championed by French civil-law countries. Thus 
empirically, French civil-law countries with high levels of allocation efficiency should improve faster in growth 
and welfare” (Asongu, 2011; pp.7-8). 
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closely followed by countries with Portuguese legal-origin. French speaking SSA and North-
Africa closely follow the overall French average but when French-SSA is directly compared 
to North Africa, the later has a bit of an edge. These results are consistent with the law and 
finance theory which expresses the dominance of Anglophone legal regimes. These findings 
are also in line with the theoretical initiatives and empirical validity of the political and 
adaptability channels expressed in Beck et al. (2003)16.  
 
Table 3: Law and legal-origin regressions  
  Regulatory Quality Rule of Law 
  Model 5 Model 5* Model 5** Model 5*** Model 6 Model 6* Model 6** Model 6*** 
 
 
 
Legal origin 
dummies 
(Instruments) 
English 0.371*** 0.454*** 0.357*** 0.245*** 0.395*** 0.429*** 0.383*** 0.244*** 
 (28.48) (17.38) (26.09) (8.751) (25.46) (9.086) (24.14) (7.063) 
French 0.286*** 0.363*** --- --- 0.247*** 0.263*** --- --- 
 (21.92) (12.31)   (15.97) (5.639)   
Frchssa --- --- 0.280*** 0.186*** --- --- 0.243*** 0.086*** 
   (19.92) (7.949)   (15.02) (3.227) 
Portuguese 0.267*** 0.390*** 0.267*** 0.212*** 0.259*** 0.473*** 0.259*** 0.293*** 
 (10.35) (10.75) (9.831) (5.693) (8.441) (8.484) (8.242) (6.324) 
Nafri 0.115*** 0.069** 0.333*** 0.238*** 0.188*** 0.158*** 0.376*** 0.238*** 
 (4.131) (2.367) (12.14) (7.521) (5.684) (4.791) (11.89) (7.305) 
 
 
 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
Trade --- --- --- --- --- 0.0008*** --- 0.001*** 
      (3.129)  (4.097) 
Inflation --- -0.001* --- --- --- -0.003*** --- -0.002*** 
  (-1.684)    (-3.456)  (-2.616) 
Gov. Exp --- --- --- 0.007*** --- --- --- 0.007*** 
    (4.622)    (4.332) 
GDPg --- 0.005** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (2.407)       
GDPpcg --- --- --- 0.005** --- --- --- --- 
    (2.317)     
Popg --- -0.035*** --- --- --- -0.026*** --- --- 
  (-3.537)    (-2.190)   
F-test(for Instruments) 13.71*** 11.17*** 353.82*** 251.86*** 25.16*** 24.99*** 275.58*** 232.80*** 
Adjusted R² 0.091 0.149 0.788 0.813 0.160 0.305 0.744 0.837 
Observations  380 348 380 346 379 346 379 315 
Popg: Population growth. Gov.Exp: Government Expenditure. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. *, **, ***: significance 
levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Student t-statistics are presented in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
16
 “Consistent with the law and finance theory, Table 3 indicates that British common law countries have 
significantly greater judicial independence, i.e., less state control over the judiciary, and significantly more 
adaptable legal systems than do French legal origin countries. Specifically, the tenure of Supreme Court judges 
and their ability to control administrative cases are all, on average, greater in British common law countries. 
Similarly, the use of case law and the ability to use equity rather than statutory law in making judgments are, on 
average, greater in British common law countries”(Beck et al.,2003; p.667) 
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5.3 Examination of law channels using a simple instrumental variable procedure  
 
 Table 4 looks at two issues: (1) whether the exogenous components of the law 
indicators explain financial development (depth and efficiency) and (2) if legal origins explain 
financial development through some other mechanisms other than the law channels. To make 
this assessment we use the TSLS estimation methodology. So here we integrate equation (3) 
into the estimations. In either combination of equations (1) and (3) or equations (2) and (3), 
two pairs of four legal origins are used as instrumental variables (French and French-SSA are 
not applied simultaneously). Even when all five instruments are used, second-stage results do 
not change significantly17.  Estimated coefficients of equations on the law channels provide 
information on whether the quality of regulation or rule of law influences financial 
development after controlling for potential endogeneity. Hence it looks at the first issue 
introduced above. The second issue is addressed by the test for overidentifying restrictions 
(OIR), whose null hypothesis argues that the instruments are not correlated with the error term 
of the equation of interest: equation (3). Thus a failure to reject this null hypothesis indicates 
instruments are valid while its rejection implies legal origins also explain financial 
development through some other mechanisms other than the law channels. Therefore when 
the endogenous control variables are integrated into the TSLS estimation (as in the 5th, 6th, 
9th and 10th columns of Table 4), results of OIR-test become a general specification of the 
validity of the instruments. We include these variables to assess the robustness of the findings 
                         
17
 To further investigate if evidence of correlation between the SSAfrican and French dummies have some 
bearing on the outcome of our regressions, for each model we carried-out three different sort of regressions: the 
first and second in which we independently verify the validity of the French and SSAfrican dummies as 
instruments and the third in which we integrate both of them. We do not find any substantial difference in 
results. This routine is respected for results in tables 5 and 6. Our use of the five dummies provides us with 
enough degrees of freedom for the OIR-test for instrument validity.  
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by controlling for other potential exogenous determinants of financial development (which are 
also theoretically and empirically endogenous to instruments) as emphasized by the law-
finance theory (see Section 4.2.2). 
  
Table 4: Second Stage Financial Depth and Efficiency regressions   
  Panel A: Second Stage Financial Depth regressions  
  Financial Depth 
  Monetary Base Financial System Deposits 
  
Model 7 Model 7* Model 7** Model 7*** Model 8 Model 8* Model 8** Model 8*** 
  M2 M2 M2 M2 Fdgdp Fdgdp Fdgdp Fdgdp 
 
Law 
Channels 
Reg. Quality 1.021*** --- 3.459*** --- 0.823*** --- 2.981*** --- 
 (9.113)  (3.222)  (26.68)  (1.805)  
Rule of Law --- 1.026*** --- 1.958*** --- 0.833*** --- 1.815*** 
  (10.99)  (6.889)  (32.84)  (6.623) 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
Trade --- --- -0.011** -0.004** --- --- -0.009** -0.004*** 
   (-2.309) (-3.447)   (-2.311) (-3.688) 
Inflation --- --- 0.002* 0.0008* --- --- 0.002* 0.0009** 
   (1.725) (1.754)   (1.805) (-3.688) 
Hausman test 68.204*** 68.008*** 178.38*** 124.61*** 26.37*** 25.93*** 152.76*** 139.83*** 
OIR(Sargan)  test 79.152*** 63.359*** 0.246 3.811 93.69*** 77.017*** 1.081 0.532 
P-values [0.000] [0.000 ] [0.884] [0.148] [0.000] [0.000] [0.582] [0.766] 
Weak I. Test(F-stats) 381.01*** 335.03*** --- --- 325.5*** 235.11*** --- --- 
Adjusted R² 0.161 0.397 0.005 0.227 0.232 0.466 0.011 0.218 
F-stats --- --- 21.62*** 102.53*** --- --- 19.36*** 78.066*** 
Observations 365 364 326 325 365 364 326 325 
          
          
  Panel B: Second Stage Financial Efficiency regressions 
  Financial Efficiency 
  Banking System Efficiency Financial System Efficiency 
  Model 9 Model 9* Model 9** Model 9*** Mod. 10 Mod. 10* Mod.10** Mod.10*** 
  BcBd BcBd BcBd BcBd FcFd FcFd FcFd FcFd 
 
Law 
Channels 
Reg. Quality 2.046*** --- 2.056*** --- 2.159*** --- 2.015*** --- 
 (32.05)  (26.89)  (30.46)  (4.240)  
Rule of Law --- 1.957*** --- -0.845 --- 2.083*** --- 0.138 
  (24.95)  (-1.424)  (23.93)  (0.307) 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
Trade --- --- --- 0.012*** --- --- 0.0005 0.008 
    (4.786)   (0.255) (4.330) 
Inflation --- --- -0.0006 -0.002** --- --- --- --- 
   (-1.024) (-2.513)     
Hausman test 184.08*** 250.73*** 161.27*** 304.01*** 84.35*** 157.2*** 78.47*** 162.35*** 
OIR(Sargan)  test 87.274*** 93.86*** 79.65*** 18.31*** 54.08*** 64.12*** 51.10*** 40.26*** 
P-values [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Weak I. Test(F-stats) 325.58*** 235.11*** --- --- --- 235.11*** --- --- 
Adjusted R² 0.037 0.00007 0.035 0.002 0.091 0.011 0.072 0.047 
Fisher-stats --- --- --- 85.44*** --- --- --- --- 
Observations 375 374 353 333 365 364 346 345 
M2: Monetary Base. Fdgdp: Financial system deposits. Bcbd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial system credit on Financial system 
deposits. Reg: Regulation. *, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (): z-statistics. Chi-square statistics for Hausman test. LM 
statistics for Sargan test. [ ]:p-values. 
 
 Results in Table 4 support both law indicators are channels to financial intermediary 
depth (panel A) and efficiency (panel B). This solves the first issue. Results of OIR-test to 
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address the second issue reveal (but for the 5th, 6th, 9th and 10th columns of panel A) that 
legal origins also explain financial development through other mechanisms than law channels 
(legal origins also explain trade and inflation).  
 
Table 5: Second Stage Financial Activity and Size regressions  
  Panel A: Second Stage Financial Activity regressions  
  Financial Activity 
  Banking System Activity Financial System Activity 
  Mod.11 Mod.11* Mod.11** Mod.11*** Mod.12 Mod.12* Mod.12** Mod.12*** 
  Pcrb Pcrb Pcrb Pcrb Pcrbof Pcrbof Pcrbof Pcrbof 
 
Law 
Channels 
Reg. Quality 0.556*** --- 2.089*** --- 0.635*** --- 2.058*** --- 
 (26.25)  (3.603)  (20.28)  (3.844)  
Rule of Law --- 0.562*** --- 1.158*** --- 0.643*** --- 1.240*** 
  (26.79)  (7.357)  (20.25)  (6.587) 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
Trade --- --- -0.006*** -0.002*** --- --- -0.006*** -0.002*** 
   (-2.646) (-3.815)   (-2.629) (-3.118) 
Inflation --- --- 0.001* 0.0003 --- --- 0.0009 0.0001 
   (1.729) (1.334)   (1.488) (0.577) 
Hausman test 0.007 9.111*** 98.83*** 46.12*** 1.549 3.56* 28.35*** 20.02*** 
OIR(Sargan)  test 81.31*** 51.20*** 0.172 6.099** 39.85*** 19.72*** 1.744 1.880 
P-values [0.000] [0.000 ] [0.917] [0.047] [0.000] [0.000] [0.418] [0.390] 
Weak I. Test(F-stats) 325.58*** 235.11*** --- --- 325.58*** 235.11*** --- --- 
Adjusted R² 0.383 0.384 0.135 0.299 0.330 0.284 0.164 0.261 
F-stats --- --- 23.54*** 106.23*** --- --- 35.19*** 97.09*** 
Observations 365 364 326 325 365 364 326 325 
          
          
  Panel B: Second Stage Financial Size regressions 
  Financial Size 
  Financial Size Financial Size 
  Mod.13  Mod.13 *  Mod.13** 
 
Mod.13*** 
 
  Dbacba  Dbacba  Dbacba 
 
Dbacba 
 
 
Law 
Channels 
Reg. Quality 2.225***  ---  1.881***  ---  
 (43.24)    (4.520)    
Rule of Law ---  2.156***  ---  0.576***  
   (34.40)    (2.370) 
 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
Trade ---  ---  0.001  0.006***  
     (0.637)  (6.266)  
Inflation ---  ---  0.0007  -0.0001  
     (1.617)  (-0.324)  
Hausman test 466.34***  477.61***  275.42***  400.91***  
OIR(Sargan)  test 23.06***  51.35***  14.14***  30.41***  
P-values [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
Weak I. Test(F-stats) 325.58***  235.11***  ---  ---  
Adjusted R² 0.239  0.207  0.134  0.094  
F-stats ---  ---  547.09***  584.34***  
Observations 372  371  331  330  
Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central 
bank assets plus deposit bank assets. Reg: Regulation. *, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (): z-statistics. Chi-square 
statistics for Hausman test. LM statistics for Sargan test. [ ]:p-values. 
 
The consistency of the OIR-test results in the 5th, 6th, 9th and 10th columns of panel A 
is suggestive there is a likelihood of better results when controlling for other exogenous 
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potential determinants of financial development(trade and inflation). Our use of the TSLS 
methodology is also justified by the rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman-test18 in 
all 16 regressions. 
Following the same analytical logic as expressed in the explanation of results in Table 
4, Table 5 addresses the two issues of whether the exogenous components of the law 
indicators explain financial development (activity and size) and whether legal origin explains 
financial development beyond the law indicators. We use the same TSLS methodology 
described above. The validity of the Hausman-test in 1119 of the 12 regressions justifies our 
TSLS estimation technique.  
On the concern of the first issue results provide support for the law channel indicators 
explaining financial development (financial activity and size for panels A and B respectively). 
The OIR-test results for the second issue are consistent with those in Table 4 in revealing, 
legal origin also explains financial activity and size through other mechanisms than law 
channels. When other determinants of financial development are controlled for, the 
instruments are valid (5th, 9th and 10th columns of Panel A). These suggest the use of an 
extended Instrumental Variable (IV) procedure could yield even more robust and appealing 
results.  
 
5.4 Examination of law channels using an extended Instrumental Variable (IV) 
procedure 
 
 Results of tables 4 and 5 have revealed that legal origin will explain financial 
development beyond its ability to explain cross-country differences in law channels when 
other determinants of financial development are not controlled for (Assertion 1). On the other 
                         
18
 The null hypothesis of the Hausman –test suggests that OLS estimates are consistent.  
19
 But for the 7th column of Panel A.  
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hand, they have also revealed that when other indicators of financial development (consistent 
with theory and empirical validity as outlined in Section. 4.2.2) are used as endogenous 
regressors of control, legal origin does not explain financial development through 
mechanisms other than law channels (Assertion 2). Therefore this section uses an extended IV 
procedure to further verify and validated these assertions. Borrowing from Beck et al. (2003) 
this requires the simultaneous examinations of our law channel indicators.   
 
Table 6: Extended IV procedure with simultaneous law channels  
  Panel A: Extended  IV Procedure without covariates 
  Financial Depth Financial Efficiency  Financial Activity  Financial Size 
  Mod. 15 Mod.15* Mod.16 Mod.16* Mod.17 Mod.17* Mod.18 Mod.18* 
  M2 Fdgdp Bcbd Fcfd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Dbacba 
 
Law 
Channels 
Reg. Quality -1.435*** -1.820*** 6.961*** 6.561*** -0.886*** -1.091** 4.234*** --- 
 (-3.415) (-4.209) (6.798) (6.493) (-2.912) (-2.571) (6.592)  
Rule of Law 2.442*** 2.629*** -4.882*** -4.388*** 1.437*** 1.720*** -1.997*** --- 
 (5.861) (6.131) (-4.826) (-4.380) (4.762) (4.086) (-3.153)  
Hausman test 118.62*** 100.34*** 396.27*** 154.20*** 39.83** 30.30*** 578.62*** --- 
OIR(Sargan)  test 23.29*** 9.29** 8.902** 7.234* 16.22*** 4.82 3.890  
P-values [0.000] [0.025] [0.030] [0.064] [0.001] [0.185] [0.273] --- 
Adjusted R² 0.400 0.389 0.102 0.119 0.209 0.123 0.115 --- 
F-stats --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Observations 364 364 374 364 364 364 371 --- 
          
  Panel B: Extended  IV Procedure with covariates 
  Financial Depth Financial Efficiency  Financial Activity  Financial Size 
  Mod. 19 Mod.19* Mod.20 Mod.20* Mod.21 Mod.21* Mod.22 Mod.22* 
  M2 Fdgdp Bcbd Fcfd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Dbacba 
 
Law 
Channels 
Reg. Quality 0.463 -0.630 9.076*** 8.266*** 0.501 -0.172 4.240*** --- 
 (0.387) (-0.751) (3.761) (3.768) (0.714) (-0.273) (3.495)  
Rule of Law 1.680** 2.144*** -5.752*** -5.094*** 0.879* 1.376*** -1.964** --- 
 (2.003) (3.648) (-3.397) (-3.314) (1.788) (3.105) (-2.252)  
 
Control 
Variables 
Trade -0.008** -0.005** -0.008 -0.006 -0.005** -0.002 -0.004 --- 
 (-2.225) (-1.999) (-1.214) (-0.973) (-2.478) (-1.505) (-1.122)  
GDPg 0.050* 0.033 0.058 0.036 0.027 0.006 0.063** --- 
 (1.664) (1.537) (0.941) (0.658) (1.545) (0.394) (2.000)  
Hausman test 172.84*** 152.91*** 309.10*** 137.74*** 84.10*** 29.77*** 270.74*** --- 
OIR(Sargan)  test 0.279 0.717 1.736 1.823 1.121 2.442 0.062 --- 
P-values [0.596] [0.396] [0.187] [0.176] [0.289] [0.118] [0.802] --- 
Adjusted R² 0.086 0.223 0.103 0.129 0.185 0.234 0.048 --- 
F-stats 47.35*** 66.50*** 41.708*** 60.35*** 43.00*** 67.55*** 159.23*** --- 
Observations 345 345 355 345 345 345 352  
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. M2: Monetary Base. Fdgdp: Financial system deposits. Bcbd: Bank credit on 
Bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private 
domestic credit by financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. Reg: Regulation. (): z-
statistics. Chi-square statistics for Hausman test. LM statistics for Sargan test. [ ]:p-values 
 
Panel A of Table 6 expresses a simultaneous examination of law channels without 
controlling for other determinants of finance. But for the 8th and 9th columns where the null 
hypothesis of the OIR-test is not rejected, overall results fully justify the first assertion (from 
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tables 4 and 5).  Panel B which looks at the second assertion fully validates it: with 
overwhelming failure to reject the null hypothesis of the OIR-test in all seven regressions. It 
follows that legal origin explains financial intermediary development through no other 
mechanisms other than law channels when other potential exogenous determinants of finance 
(justified by the law-finance theory) are controlled for.  The use of TSLS is justified by the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman-test in all of the seven regressions. 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
 While past works investigated the law-finance nexus from a broad spectrum, the 
absence of data on Africa rendered it difficult to verify hypotheses resulting from pioneering 
works on this continent. The African continent is an ideal premise for the assessment of 
outcomes of first works because, not only is it lagging behind financially, but it was (is) a 
fertile ground for colonialism (neocolonialism). The big appeal of this paper is that to the best 
of our knowledge it is the first of its kind to use data collected after pioneering works on the 
law-finance nexus to assess hypotheses resulting from those pioneering works exclusively in 
the context of Africa.  
 Our results partially support the current consensus (LLSV., 1998; Beck et al., 2003) 
that English common-law countries provide for legal systems that improve conditions for 
financial depth, activity and size than French civil-law countries. On average Francophone 
countries with civil-law legal origin dominate in financial intermediary efficiency.  Those 
with Portuguese civil-law origin fall in-between. But for financial efficiency, sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) French speaking countries are least while North African countries dominate 
even English common-law countries in financial intermediary dynamics of depth and activity. 
 28
SSA French speaking countries dominate the English, Portuguese and North African countries 
in financial intermediary efficiency as well: this is consistent with recent empirical literature 
(Asongu, 2011) and past theoretical initiatives (Mundell, 1972).  
 We also find evidence that legal origin will explain financial development beyond its 
ability to explain cross-country differences in law channels when other determinants of 
financial development are not controlled for. On the other hand when other indicators of 
financial development (consistent with theory and empirical validity) are used as endogenous 
regressors of control, legal origin does not explain financial development through 
mechanisms other than law channels. In terms of policy implications results support the 
benefits of the rule of law and quality of regulation as channels to financial intermediary 
development in the African continent.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Presentation of legal origin and countries 
Legal origin Countries Num. 
 
 
English 
  
Botswana, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi,  
Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia. 
 
 
16 
 
French 
Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, 
Tunisia. 
 
 
18 
Portuguese  Angola, Cape Verde,  Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique. 
 
4 
French  sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo. 
 
 
15 
North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia. 
 
4 
Num: Number of countries.  
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Appendix 2  : Correlation Analyses 
Financial  Intermediary  Development Variables Law  Variables Control Variables Instrumental  Variables  
Depth Efficiency Activity Size Reg. 
Qua. 
Rule of 
Law 
 
Infl. 
 
Trade 
 
Popg 
Gov. 
Exp. 
 
GDPg 
GDP 
pcg 
 
Eng. 
 
Frch. 
 
Port. 
 
Frssa 
 
Nafri 
 
M2 Fdgdp Bcbd Fcfd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
1.000 0.974 -0.07 -0.00 0.74 0.598 0.394 0.402 0.630 -0.06 0.30 -0.46 0.33 -0.05 0.057 0.21 -0.230 0.034 -0.43 0.50 M2 
 1.000 -0.04 0.069 0.80 0.685 0.460 0.482 0.682 -0.05 0.32 -0.49 0.37 -0.01 0.101 0.29 -0.283 -0.004 -0.46 0.45 Fdgdp 
  1.000 0.870 0.40 0.421 0.259 0.193 -0.008 -0.11 -0.23 0.010 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 -0.26 0.415 -0.242 0.40 0.01 Bcbd 
           1.000 0.53 0.679 0.282 0.302 0.105 -0.08 -0.23 -0.04 0.04 -0.09 -0.07 -0.11 0.250 -0.217 0.24 0.003 Fcfd 
    1.00 0.930 0.515 0.619 0.620 -0.06 0.106 -0.41 0.24 -0.02 0.077 0.15 -0.115 -0.063 -0.31 0.450 Pcrb 
     1.000 0.454 0.575 0.533 -0.05 0.050 -0.35 0.26 -0.03 0.055 0.19 -0.145 -0.079 -0.29 0.318 Pcrbof 
      1.000 0.489 0.455 -0.09 0.210 -0.29 0.27 0.06 0.133 0.007 0.016 -0.036 -0.14 0.258 Dbacba 
       1.000 0.799 -0.09 0.046 -0.27 0.19 0.02 0.086 0.231 -0.149 -0.129 -0.24 0.181 Reg. Qua. 
        1.000 -0.09 0.239 -0.34 0.34 0.000 0.082 0.308 -0.233 -0.116 -0.33 0.230 Rule of L. 
         1.00 0.103 0.039 -0.14 0.078 0.072 -0.035 -0.074 0.172 -0.06 -0.027 Infl. 
          1.000 -0.40 0.37 -0.01 0.082 0.228 -0.295 0.124 -0.28 -0.081 Trade 
           1.00 -0.33 0.22 -0.01 -0.204 0.229 -0.047 0.40 -0.301 Popg 
            1.00 -0.02 0.061 0.309 -0.276 -0.054 -0.33 0.037 Gov. Exp. 
             1.000 0.971 0.010 -0.096 0.139 -0.09 0.001 GDPg 
              1.000 0.059 -0.143 0.138 -0.18 0.075 GDPpcg 
               1.000 -0.809 -0.292 -0.68 -0.118 Eng. 
                1.000 -0.325 0.85 0.189 Frch. 
                 1.000 -0.27 -0.117 Port. 
                  1.00 -0.277 Frssa 
                   1.000 Nafri 
M2: Monetary Base. Fdgdp: Financial system deposits. Bcbd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: 
Private domestic credit by financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. Reg.Qua: Regulation Quality. Infl:Inflation. Popg: Population growth. Gov.Exp: 
Government Expenditure. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg:GDP per capita growth. Eng: English legal origin. Frch: French legal origin. Port: Portuguese legal origin. Frssa: French sub-Saharan Africa. Nafri: North 
Africa. 
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